Conscientious Objection to War: The Background and a Current Appraisal by Fox, Richard P.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1982
Conscientious Objection to War: The Background
and a Current Appraisal
Richard P. Fox
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard P. Fox, Conscientious Objection to War: The Background and a Current Appraisal, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 77 (1982)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss1/7
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO WAR:
THE BACKGROUND AND A CURRENT APPRAISAL
RICHARD P. Fox*
I. INTRODUCTION
Military Service is a patriotic obligation of every citizen who
desires to share in the benefits and protections ... of the United
States.'
T HIS STATEMENT ON MILITARY SERVICE is derived from the Air Force
regulation pertaining to conscientious objectors to war.2 One might
question the propriety of the Air Force officially defining the "patriotic"
obligations of citizens; however, most Americans would probably agree
with the statement set forth by the Air Force.
No person has been inducted into the Armed Forces through the
Selective Service since 1973. The requirement to register for the draft
was ended and the long-familiar neighborhood draft boards closed their
doors. Then, during the summer of 1980, young men were again re-
quired to register with the Selective Service System.' The response to
the 1980 registration requirement was not as extreme as the anti-draft
activism during the Vietnam era since the United States was at peace.
The government only required that young men, aged eighteen to twenty,
fill out a simple form at their local post offices. Even this slight move
toward resuming conscription, however, caused many youths to ex-
amine their beliefs regarding participation in war.
Conscientious objection has not been a dead issue since the termina-
tion of hostilities in Southeast Asia. Department of Defense regula-
tions' have provided for those in the Armed Forces to request C.O.
*B.A., University of California at Los Angeles; M.A. (Ethics), Pepperdine
University; J.D., Loyola University School of Law, Los Angeles; Major, Infantry,
U.S. Army Reserve (retired). This article is partially based on the author's forth-
coming book, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO WAR: FROM THE
BEGINNING TO THE 1980's.
1 32 C.F.R. § 888e.6 (1980).
A "conscientious objector" is defined by statute as one "who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form ... the term 'religious training and belief' does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 50
U.S.C. app. § 456j (1980).
a Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247, 48,130 (1981), under authority
of 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453-56, 458-71(a) (1981).
' 32 C.F.R. § 75 (1971) and its predecessors have provided for in-service cons-
cientious objection since 1962. Id
5 "C.O." will be used occasionally throughout this Article for "conscientious
objector."
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status. During 1981, the Army processed 136 such applications.' In the
Navy, 175 members formally asked to be declared conscientious objec-
tors,7 as did 38 Marines8 and 100 Air Force personnel.'
A substantial body of C.O. case law has been developed over the past
decade. These decisions virtually all relate to habeas corpus petitions
filed by in-service conscientious objectors. However, they will be citable
precedent if conscription resumes and an expectable plethora of C.O.
cases are litigated.
First, this article reviews the legal history of conscientious objection
to war in the United States. Then the current status of the law and the
1982 Selective Service Regulations"0 are discussed and appraised. It is
hoped that some of the popular misconceptions regarding conscientious
objection will be dissipated by this article.
II. BACKGROUND
The religious obligation of those subscribing to the Judeo-Christian
faiths to participate or not in war has been debated by theologians and
ethicists for thousands of years. At least since the Vietnam era, all major
Christian denominations and the three branches of Judaism (Orthodox,
Conservative and Reformed) have published official statements pertain-
ing to conscientious objection." Without exception, these statements
support those who feel constrained to apply for conscientious objector
status.
In 1952, Justice William 0. Douglas stated that Americans "are a
religious people whose institutions pre-suppose a Supreme Being."'" In
his dissent in Engel v. Vitale, Justice Potter Stewart set out in some
detail many of "the religious traditions of our people, reflected in
countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government.""
One of these American traditions and practices, although not mentioned
by Justice Stewart, is recognition of conscientious objection to war.
' Letter from Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
to the author, undated.
' Letter from D.P. Klauer, Naval Military Personnel Command to the author
(November 3, 1981).
1 Letter from D.R. Mabry, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to the author
(November 23, 1981).
" Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Eric M. Solander, Air Force Office of
Public Affairs to the author (November 3, 1981).
"- 32 C.F.R. §§ 1602, 1605, 1609, 1618, 1621, 1624, 1627, 1630, 1636, 1639, 1642,
1645, 1648, 1651, 1653 (1982).
" S. PERRY, WORDS OF CONSCIENCE (9th ed. 1980).
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
370 U.S. 421, 444-50 (1962).
" Id. at 446.
[VCol. 31:77
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Prior to 1775, the American colonies enacted 600 laws governing their
militias, most of which contained provisions for the exemption of cons-
cientious objectors.'5 Between the time the Constitution was first
drafted and ultimately ratified, four of the thirteen original col-
onies-Virginia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island-in-
dicated a desire for a constitutional exemption from military service for
C.O.'s.'" James Madison proposed to the First Congress a constitutional
amendment granting conscientious objectors an exemption from
military service. 7 The amendment was rejected on various grounds,
none of which stated that conscientious objection was not an important
right of constitutional magnitude. 8
The 1787 Constitution granted Congress the power to "raise and sup-
port armies."'9 Wasting little time, Congress established a War Depart-
ment in August of 1789, and in September 1789 authorized the Presi-
dent to induct state militiamen into federal service if Indians attacked
frontier settlements." Actually, involuntary military service was a
minor issue until the Civil War, with its tremendous personnel re-
quirements. In August 1862, when Lincoln requested 300,000 volunteers
for nine months service, only 87,000 men were recruited."' America's
first Selective Service law was then enacted in 1863." Only 255,373 of
the 2,690,401 men who served in the Union Army from 1861 to 1865,
however, were draftees. 3
Although the Union draft laws contained so many provisions for
avoidance that its chief administrator declared it "essentially a law not
to secure military service, but to exempt men from it,"'4 some conscien-
tious objectors did find themselves members of the Grand Army of the
Republic. There is evidence that these men were harassed; some were
hung by their thumbs and others were stabbed with bayonets. At least
" Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United
States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 412-13 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Russell].
'" Brahms, They Step to a Different Drummer: A Critical Analysis of the Cur-
rent Department of Defense Position Vis-a-Vis In-Service Conscientious Objec-
tors, 47 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brahms].
17 Id. at 6-7, citing I ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 434-35
(1834).
Id. at 8.
', U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
M. KREIDBERG & M. HENRY, HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMY 26 (1955) [hereinafter cited as KREIDBERG & HENRY].
" Shaw, Selective Service: A Source of Military Manpower, 27 MIL. L. REV.
35, 42 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Shaw].
' Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863). The Act was upheld against
constitutional challenge in Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 295 (1864).
" Shaw, supra note 21.
"4 L. LERIWILL, THE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM IN THE U.S. ARMY 95
(1954).
1982]
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one-Cyrus Guernsey Pringle-was allegedly tied to the ground and ex-
posed to the rain and hot sun.25
For more than a half century following the Civil War, the United
States had no conscription. The occasion for resuming the draft was, of
course, World War I. Congress enacted a Selective Service law in 1917.2
For conscientious objectors this statute provided for assignment to non-
combatant duties while in the Armed Forces, not for exemption from
military service. 7
To obtain noncombatant assignment, the burden was on the
registrant to show membership in a "well-recognized religious sect or
organization" whose tenets forbade participation in war in any form.28
Draft boards responsible for classification of registrants, however, were
not furnished with any approved list of sects or organizations meeting
the legal requirements for C.O. status.' During the World War I draft,
64,693 men applied for conscientious objector status; 56,830 applications
were approved." Sixteen hundred C.O.'s were convicted of the criminal
offenses of failure to report or failure to cooperate in assigned noncom-
batant work.'
In his dissent in Ehlert v. United States,3 2 Justice Douglas described
the treatment of some C.O.'s by the armed forces during World War I.
Conscientious objectors were shot, imprisoned for long terms, subjected
to violence and indignities and hung by their fingers.' One Amish C.O.
refused to wear a military uniform and as a result he was imprisoned;"
he later contracted pneumonia and died. His corpse was dressed in an
Army uniform and sent home to his parents. 5
After winning World War I, America reverted to all-volunteer armed
forces. The next mobilization requiring conscription was in 1940. The
World War II Selective Service Act, the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, 6 was in
effect from September 16, 1940 to March 31, 1947."7 During this period
? J. KINCHY, THOSE WHO SAY No 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KINCHY].
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15 § 3, 40 Stat. 76 (1917) (repealed 1919).
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15 § 4, 40 Stat. 78 (1917) (repealed 1919). "Noncom-
batant duties" for members of the Armed Forces are such jobs as medical corps-
man, not entailing the use of weapons. Id.
28 1&.
28 KREIDBERG & HENRY, supra note 20, at 275. This discretion led some boards
to treat religious and even nonreligious C.O.'s in the same manner. Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 366-67 n.19 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
W Id.
", Shaw, supra note 21, at 64.
402 U.S. 99, 108-18 (1971).
Id. at 110.
KINCHY, supra note 25, at 51-52.
28Id.
28 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (repealed 1947).
Shaw, supra note 21, at 51-52.
[Vol. 31:77
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fifty million men were registered, but ten million men were actually in-
ducted." Conscientious objectors represented only about 0.15% of all
registrants.'
The Burke-Wadsworth Bill contained many features of the Selective
Service System which persisted through the Vietnam era. Men regis-
tered with local boards composed of their neighbors, filled out question-
naires and were classified by their boards pursuant to Selective Service
regulations."' A registrant had procedural rights including a personal
appearance before his local board, further review by an appeals board
and, under certain circumstances, an appeal to the President. 1
A historic first of the 1940 Act was its provision for trial by the civil-
ian federal courts for alleged violators. 2 Under the 1917 Act, a draftee
was considered a member of the armed forces subject solely to military
court-martial as of the date established for induction in his order to
report. 3 Unlike its predecessors, however, the 1940 Draft Act provided
for both those C.O.'s who objected to any service whatsoever as mem-
bers of the armed forces and those who objected only to combatant
duties.4 4 There is a distinct and extraordinary difference between these
two classifications. The former is an exemption from military service;
the latter is a mere duty limitation after entry into the armed forces.
Under the 1940 Act, the local board had to determine that an appli-
cant for either type of C.O. status held an objection based on "religious
training and belief." Selective Service National Headquarters issued
guidance to local boards, stating that "religious training and belief' in
the C.O. context was pertinent "regardless of ... sect or creed."'6 There-
fore, the 1940 Act with the Selective Service Headquarters interpreta-
Id at 52.
Russell, supra note 15, at 432.
,0 Shaw, supra note 21, at 52, citing from a summary of the Selective Service
System by Justice Hugo Black in Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1949) (af-
firming conviction of a C.O. who failed to report for alternative civilian service).
41 Id
42 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 893 (1940) (repealed 1947).
4" Shaw, supra note 21, at 48; see Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1171, 1198-200 (1940).
" Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889 (1940), Selective Service
Regs. §§ 364-65 (1940). Since before the Vietnam era to the present, a 1-0 C.O. is
one determined to be opposed to military training and service, both combatant
and noncombatant. 32 C.F.R. § 1630.17 (1982). The 1-A-0 is opposed only to com-
batant service. He can be inducted and assigned to noncombatant duties. 32
C.F.R. § 1630.11 (1982).
," The 1-0 C.O. is exempt from induction into the Armed Forces but has
always been and is required to perform government-assigned civilian work con-
tributing to the national health, safety or interest for a period of time equal to
that which he would have served in the military. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456j (1980). In
the author's experience, such work is typically a lowly paid job, e.g. hospital
orderly, located far from the C.O.'s usual residence.
46 Selective Service National Headquarters Release No. 128 (Nov. 23, 1940).
1982]
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tion, shifted the religious aspect of the test for C.O. classification from
proven membership in a recognized pacifist denomination to a regis-
trant's individual beliefs. 7
Men refusing induction under the 1940 Act were tried in federal dis-
trict court and because the test for C.O. classification was based on a
registrant's individual beliefs rather than his membership in a pacifist
faith, the courts were faced with deciding the "religious" aspect of con-
scientious objection. During 1943, in United States v. Kauten,'8 the Sec-
ond Circuit held it unnecessary to attempt a definition of "religion" to
decide Kauten's appeal; nonetheless, the court curiously went on to
define it as "a belief finding expression in a conscience which
categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest
and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets .. .
The author of Kauten, Judge Augustus Hand, alluding to Socrates,
Luther, Menander and Wordsworth, interpreted the 1940 Act as "more
generous" toward C.O.'s than the 1917 Act because it took into account
the characteristics of "a more skeptical generation."50 However, the
criminal conviction of Kauten, an artist and admitted atheist or agnos-
tic,"' was upheld. Kauten was significant in that the court held the Selec-
tive Service System could find a registrant entitled to C.O. status des-
pite a lack of traditional religious belief in a Supreme Being.
In 1943, the Second Circuit also granted a habeas corpus petition filed
by the mother of a conscientious objector draftee who had accepted in-
duction in United States ex reL Phillips v. Downer.2 This decision
followed Kauten by reiterating that "religious training and belief"
meant an individual belief which could rest upon moral or philosophical
ideas .5
However, the Ninth Circuit decided the matter differently in Berman
v. United States," a case decided after the end of World War II. Despite
a brilliant dissent by Judge Denman," the Berman court held qualifica-
tion for conscientious objector status demanded a belief in a deity. 6 The
"7 Comment, Selective Service System-Scope of the Conscientious Objector
Exemption after Welsh v. United States, 19 KAN. L. REV. 231, 233 (1971).
"8 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
49 Id. at 708.
50 Id.
51 Id at 707 n.2.
12 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
' Id at 524.
' 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946), reh'g denied, 329
U.S. 833 (1947). One of Berman's attorneys, J.B. Tietz of Los Angeles, would have
his position in Berman vindicated twenty-four years later in his representation of
the petitioner C.O. in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
5 156 F.2d 382-85.
Id at 381.
[Vol. 31:77
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court attempted to define "religion" by comparing it to science, 7 but
finally relied upon Funk and Wagnall's dictionary definition' rather
than works of philosophy or theology.
During World War II some conscientious objectors denied C.O. status
by Selective Service accepted induction rather than face a criminal trial.
There were also those, presumably, whose consciences crystallized only
after entry into the Armed Forces.59 Justice Douglas, in his dissent in
Ehlert v. United States," discussed treatment of these men. Apparently
World War II C.O.'s were handled more leniently than those of World
War 1.61 There were instances, however, of conscientious objectors being
court-martialed with sentences including death.2
After World War II, Congress allowed the Selective Service Act to
expire on March 31, 1947.3 All volunteer Armed Forces, however, lasted
only a matter of months. In 1948 conscription was restored. This peace-
time draft precipitated demonstrations, pre-shadowing the massive
resistance of the Vietnam era. On February 12, 1947, 500 youths in
several cities either publicly destroyed their draft cards or mailed them
to President Truman. 5 By 1949, forty men had been imprisoned for
refusing to register with the Selective Service."
The Korean era involved two Selective Service Acts, those of 19487
and 1951.6 To eliminate the possibility of the courts following the liberal
Kauten definition of "religious training and belief," the 1948 Act
specifically required belief in a Supreme Being.5 This, of course,
presented serious constitutional problems: If Congress, for any purpose,
Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 381-82.
"Crystallization" of conscience in the C.O. context is defined by the Selec-
tive Service as "becoming conscious of the fact that he is opposed to participation
in war in any form." 32 C.F.R. § 1636.1(b)(1) (1982).
60 402 U.S. 99, 111 (1971).
61 Id
62 KINCHY, supra note 25, at 56.
' Act of June 29, 1946, ch. 522, § 7,.60 Stat. 341-42 (extending, amending and
repealing the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940).
" Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453-56, 458-71(a) (1981)).
65 M. FERBER & S. LYND, THE RESISTANCE 3 (1971).
Id.
67 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453-56, 458-71(a) (1981)).
6" 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch.
144, 65 Stat. 75 (amending the Universal Training and Service Act of 1948, ch.
625, 62 Stat. 604).
69 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612-13. The provi-
sion was retained in the 1951 Act, 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, ch. 144, § 1(g), 65 Stat. 75, 86.
1982]
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can require belief in a Supreme Being, why could not Congress require
belief in a particular Supreme Being? Would it be the spiritual,
transcendent, omnipotent and omniscient God of Judeo-Christianity?
Would the Supreme Being of Congress also include the deistic god who
might have died, and the pantheistic god who is in all living things?
Cases brought under the Korean conflict conscription laws dwindled
and then ceased. The Vietnam era was about to begin. Aside from the
"religious training and belief" requirement, much of the law of conscien-
tious objection had been clearly established as it still stands in 1982. To
qualify as a C.O., an applicant had to be opposed to participation in any
war in any form. This requirement excluded "selective objectors" who
are individuals objecting only to a particular war. According to the
Kauten0 court, such individuals are really political objectors.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction of a conscientious ob-
jector in 1955,71 settled any possible misunderstanding of the "opposi-
tion to all war" requirement for C.O. status. "War" was defined as "ac-
tual military conflict between nations of the earth in our time-wars
with bombs and bullets, tanks, planes and rockets."72 Furthermore, the
Court held that a conscientious objector need not be opposed to war
itself, but only to his personal participation in war.73
Again in 1955, the Supreme Court held that the essential test for con-
scientious objection was the applicant's sincerity "in objecting, on
religious grounds, to participating in war in any form."74 Finally, in 1955,
the Supreme Court decided two cases" involving procedural rights for
C.O. applicants. The Court held that a conscientious objector had to be
furnished with a copy of any adverse material placed in his file which
was used to deny his application." In addition, procedural due process
for C.O.'s has included the right to a meaningful hearing at which the ap-
plicant must be permitted to comment upon and possibly rebut any un-
favorable information in his file since 1955."7 Courts would enforce pro-
cedures established by Selective Service law and regulations designed
to be "fair and just." 8
Also fixed in Selective Service law, as the Vietnam era dawned, was
the doctrine of "exhaustion of remedies."79 This judicially-created rule
10 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
72 Id. at 391.
7 Id. at 390.
' Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955).
7 Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Gonzales v. United States,
348 U.S. 407 (1955).
7 348 U.S. at 403-05, 413-14.
17 Id. at 415-16.
7' Id. at 417.
" See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Falbo v. United States, 320
U.S. 549 (1944). Both Falbo and Estep were conscientious objectors.
[Vol. 31:77
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meant that a registrant on trial for failure to report for induction0 was
precluded from raising a defense of Selective Service illegality unless he
had taken all available administrative appeals and reported for induc-
tion, refusing only to take the final step necessary to change his status
from civilian to soldier.81 If a registrant believed his classification had no
basis in fact, 2 he had the option of reporting for and accepting induc-
tion"3 and then petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 Choosing this
unattractive course of action meant serving in the military throughout
the time while a court was petitioned, held a hearing and decided the
case in the registrant/soldier's favor and ordered his release from
custody.
III. THE VIETNAM ERA: AN OVERVIEW
As of December 1, 1964, there were 28,994,334 men registered and
classified by the Selective Service.85 Of these, 10,414 were classified as
1-0 conscientious objectors, exempt from military service, but not from
alternative civilian service.8 Another 19,000 men were not draftable
because of their employment in agriculture and 84,899 were exempt as
ministers and divinity students. 7
In 1965, the Supreme Court began to resolve the "Supreme Being"
issue involved in conscientious objector cases.88 Daniel Andrew Seeger
stated in his C.O. application that he held a "belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely
ethical creed sense."89 The sincerity of Seeger's belief was not question-
ed.90
The Seeger Court set forth a new test for the "religious training and
' "Induction" here means either entry into the Armed Forces or, in the case
of a man already classified as a 1-0 C.O., reporting for alternative civilian service.
81 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. at 123; Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. at
553. A fairly complete discussion of the procedures necessary to exhaust
remedies as of 1967 is in Comment, Judicial Review of Selective Service Action"
A Need for Reform, 56 CAL. L. REV. 448, 452-54 (1968).
' The "basis in fact" test was established by Estep v. United States, 327 U.S.
at 122-23.
See note 80 supra.
, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. at 123-24. This was considered a "quite il-
lusory remedy in many instances." Id. at 129 (Murphy, J., concurring).
' Comment, Selective Service Ramifications in 1964, 29 MIL. L. REV. 123, 125(1965), citing Monthly Bulletin of National Headquarters, Selective Service
System.
" Id. In fact, 2,286 C.O.'s were performing alternative civilian service on Dec.
1, 1964, and 5,981 were classified as having completed such service.
97 Id.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id at 166.
9 Id
19821
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belief" requirement for conscientious objector status: "[a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption."9 The decision caused predictable consternation in the
military establishment. A 1966-67 advisory panel headed by General
Mark W. Clark warned that Seeger would generate "an ever-increasing
number of unjustified appeals for exemption from military service.' ' 2
The principal statute under which most Vietnam era C.O.'s would be
processed was enacted on June 30, 1967." As of that date, 34,235,023
men were registered and classified, of which 10,364 were 1-0 conscien-
tious objectors." The number classified as exempt ministers and divini-
ty students had risen to 101,474."
The 1967 Act, to accord with Seeger,9" contained no reference to a
"Supreme Being," but continued to exclude from the definition of
"religious training and belief," "essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."97 Both the
50-year-old statutory prohibition against pre-induction judicial review of
Selective Service actions98 and the judge-made "exhaustion of remedies"
requirement99 were respectively continued and made explicit. The 1967
Act provided that:
[n]o judicial review shall be made of the classification or process-
ing of any registrant ... except as a defense to a criminal prose-
cution . . .after the registrant has responded either affirma-
tively or negatively to an order to report for induction, or for
civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed
to participation in war in any form. [1-0].100
91 Id at 176.
Q Tarr, Selective Service and Conscientious Objectors, 57 A.B.A. J. 976, 977
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Tarr].
91 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100
(amending the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 62
Stat. 604).
" Comment, Selective Service and the 1967 Statute, 40 MIL. L. REV. 33, 34
(1968).
9 Id.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7, 81 Stat. 100,
104.
" Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 79-80; continued in the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885, 893, and the
Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 10(b)(2), 62 Stat. 604, 620. "Pre-induction
judicial review" in connection with Selective Service cases pertains to the filing
of petitions for extraordinary writs, usually in the nature of injunction or man-
damus, by registrants in the federal district courts.
" See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
100 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 8(c), 81 Stat. 100,
104. This remains unchanged as of 1982. 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3) (1980).
[Vol. 31:77
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The use by Selective Service of its "delinquency" regulations to ac-
celerate induction was ultimately halted by the Supreme Court in 1970.
The case, Gutknecht v. United States,"' involved a student who sur-
rendered his draft card as an act of protest. 2 Gutknecht was declared
delinquent, then ordered for induction which he refused. 3 The Court
held that the Selective Service had no "freewheeling authority to ride
herd on the registrants using immediate induction as a disciplinary or
vindictive measure.""4
The Supreme Court also resolved the issue of pre-induction judicial
review by court injunction under the 1967 Act in three cases:
Oestereich v. Selective Service Board,"0 5 Breen v. Selective Service
Board"' and Clark v. Gabriel."7 These cases are currently definitive
since the statutory prohibition of pre-induction judicial review continues
to be present."0' Oestereich and Breen were student protestors against
whom Selective Service had taken punitive reclassification action.
Gabriel was a C.O. whose application was denied by the Selective Ser-
vice System. Divinity student Oestereich returned his draft card to the
government as an act of protest. The Court held he had a right to pre-
induction judicial review, not on first amendment grounds, but because
the Selective Service delinquency regulations were not broad enough to
allow withdrawal of Oestereich's statutory classification as a divinity
student.
Breen was the holder of an ordinary student deferment at the time
the Selective Service invoked its delinquency regulations to reclassify
him for his dissent."9 The Court did not agree with the government's at-
tempt to distinguish Breen from divinity student Oestereich and held
that Breen was also entitled to pre-induction judicial review."'
However, conscientious objector Gabriel was not as fortunate. The
Court held that C.O.'s, unlike students, have no right to pre-induction
judicial review because entitlement to conscientious objector status in-
volves "determination of fact and an exercise of judgment" by local
boards."'
Insight can be gained into the Selective Service and Department of
Justice positions on conscientious objectors during much of the Vietnam
... 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
" Id. at 297.
10 Id.
10 Id at 306.
10 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
'06 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
393 U.S. 256 (1968).
' 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3) (1980).
396 U.S. at 462.
"' Id. at 467-68.
"'. 393 U.S. 258; accord Fein v. Local Board No. 7, 405 U.S. 365 (1972).
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era by the 1969 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Haughton."2
The government unsuccessfully argued that C.O. applicants were not
entitled to reasons for denial of their applications" 3 and that conscien-
tious objector status required complete personal pacifism."" Despite
Haughton's avowed "equivalent" belief in a Supreme Being"5 and his
reliance upon Bible reading as well as other religious studies,"' the
government claimed Haughton's beliefs were based on a "personal
moral code.""7 The basis for this contention was that Haughton's C.O.
application frequently referred to morality."8 The court observed that
morality and religion are not mutually exclusive." 9 Finally, the court
held the fact that Haughton belonged to and supported anti-war groups
was consistent with conscientious objection and was not, as the govern-
ment claimed, evidence of insincerity.2 '
Welsh v. United States' was decided during the Vietnam era and
proved to be the capstone case regarding conscientious objection. The
Court was sharply divided in reversing the conviction of a C.O. who
refused induction.'22 Welsh explicitly was not "religious" in any
commonly-accepted use of that term;2 ' however, he was opposed to war
in any form2 4 and he was found to be sincere in this belief. 2 ' The Welsh
decision made not only those holding non-theistic beliefs parallel to
those held by traditional C.O.'s eligible for C.O. status, 2 ' but even those
whose beliefs were purely ethical or moral. A conscientious objector
could be one who believed, as did Welsh, that taking anyone's life is
morally wrong.
In Justice Harlan's opinion, Welsh totally eliminated religious content
as a requirement for conscientious objector status.'28 The Selective Ser-
212 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969).
"' Id. at 739, 742-43.
".. Id. at 741-42. The government's position was clearly contrary to the pro-
nouncements of Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
"1 Id. at 739.
"1 Id. at 740.
".. Id. at 742.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
11 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
"- Black, J., wrote the opinion in which Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J.,
joined. Harlan, J., concurred in a separate opinion. Dissenting were Burger, C.J.,
White and Stewart, J.J. while Blackmun, J., did not take part in the decision. Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 337.
2 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 U.S. at 343.
Id at 345.
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vice Memorandum implementing Welsh stated that "religious training
and belief' may include moral or ethical concepts, even though an appli-
cant may think his beliefs are not religious." 9
The year 1971 witnessed an amended Selective Service Act"' and
several important decisions on conscientious objection from the
Supreme Court that still stand. The first of these cases, Clay v. United
States,"' involved the then-heavyweight boxing champion of the world,
Muhammed Ali. In reversing Clay's conviction, the Court unequivocally
set forth the prima facie elements required for conscientious objector
status: 2 (1) conscientious opposition to war in any form, based on
religious training and belief as construed in Seeger 13 and Welsh," and
(2) sincerity.
Another important 1971 case was Gillette v. United States." The
Court made its final pronouncement denying C.O. status to a selective
objector.' Gillette made clear that cases involving in-service conscien-
tious objectors would be interpreted under the same standards as Selec-
tive Service cases.117 Finally, the Court set to rest the erroneous idea,
held by many Selective Service and military personnel, that conscien-
tious objection requires complete personal pacifism. 8'
The 1971 MSS Act'3 9 effected several amendments to its predecessor.
Significantly, for conscientious objectors, the 1971 Act incorporated
that part of Haughton' ° requiring that reasons for denial of classifica-
tions be furnished to applicants, upon request, by local and appeal
129 Tarr, supra note 92, at 979.
ISO Military Selective Service Act, Pub. L. No. 92-129, 85 Stat. 348 (1971)
(amending the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat.
100). Although again amended in 1979, Department of Defense Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-107, §§ 811-12, 93 Stat. 803, 815-16 (1980); and in 1980, Act of Dec.
23, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-584, § 3, 94 Stat. 3377, this statute is essentially the cur-
rent Military Selective Service Act (MSS Act), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453-56,
458-71(a) (1981).
1 403 U.S. 698 (1971). An interesting description of how the decision was
reached is found in B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 157-60 (1979).
"' 403 U.S. at 700.
13 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
114 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
13 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
1W Id. at 422-43.
117 Id. at 442.
"' Id. at 447-48.
"' Amendments to Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-129,
85 Stat. 348 (1971).
4o See note 112 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v.
Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472 (5th
Cir. 1971).
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boards. Until the 1971 Act, the Selective Service had never been com-
pelled by statute to furnish reasons for its decisions.'
IV. THE IN-SERVICE C.O.
Since 1962, regulations of the Department of Defense have provided
conscientious objector processing for members of the armed forces." 2 In-
service requests for C.O. status were few during the first years that
these regulations were in effect. During 1965, the earliest year for
which statistics are available, only 669 applications were made by all
armed forces members.1 3 Of these, 335 were approved to grant noncom-
batant status and 109 C.O. discharges were issued-an over sixty-six
percent rate of approval.'" In 1966 and 1967, only about thirty percent
of the 1300 conscientious objector applications submitted were ap-
proved. 145
As troop strength in Vietnam rose and anti-war activity increased,
both the number of in-service C.O. applications and their approval rate
kept pace. By 1971, the armed forces were processing 4,381 C.O. applica-
tions and approving more than sixty-three percent of them."6 During
1972, over seventy-seven percent of the 2,673 conscientious objector
claims submitted were granted."7
There are several possible reasons for the increase of favorable con-
sideration by the military departments of conscientious objector claims
during this period. The armed forces may have realized that a denied
C.O. in military rank does not make an effective soldier; 148 or perhaps
the government was merely responding to the federal courts increasingly
liberal attitude during this period in granting petitions for writs of
habeas corpus to in-service conscientious objectors.
When courts first considered cases brought by armed forces person-
nel who had been denied C.O. status under the in-service conscientious
objector regulations, there was a grave question regarding reviewabil-
ity.14 In 1968, the issue was finally decided by the Second Circuit in
... United States ex reL Zehman v. Carpenter, 457 F.2d 621, 622 n.1 (2d Cir.
1972); see Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006 (1972).
"' Department of Defense Directive 1300.6, August 21, 1962, codified at 32
C.F.R. § 75 (1981). The regulation allows for applications for discharge (1-0) or for
assignment to noncombatant duties (1-A-0).
143 1 S.S.L.R. 6027 (1973).
1" Id
",' Id.
146 Id.
147 1&
14 Brahms, supra note 16, at 18.
"4 In Gilliam v. Reaves, 263 F. Supp. 378 (W.D. La. 1966), and In re Kanewske,
260 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Cal. 1966), the courts had no problem in determining that
they had jurisdiction to decide in-service C.O. cases. Contra Chavez v. Fergusson,
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Hammond v. Lenfest.'51 Judge Kaufman, writing for himself and Judge
Waterman, conclusively held that administratively denied, in-service
conscientious objectors were subject to writs of habeas corpus. The
Hammond court settled the question of judicial review by pointing out
that the court was bound by validly promulgated regulations of the gov-
ernment."6 ' Therefore, even if conscientious objector status was a mat-
ter of mere "legislative grace" rather than a constitutional right, to
allow the military complete discretion to deny C.O. applications would
render the applicable regulations nugatory.'52 Hammond also estab-
lished the "based in fact standard" as the test for judicial review in in-
service C.O. claims. 53
Although Hammond v. Lenfest settled the issue of judicial review of
in-service C.O. claims, the government still used "exhaustion of
remedies" arguments in an attempt to avoid decisions on the merits of
these cases. One argument was that a denied, in-service conscientious
objector had a statutory "remedy" existing of an application to the mili-
tary Board for Correction of Records,"M which had to be "exhausted" be-
fore the matter was ripe for judicial review. During 1969, the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed with this proposition in Craycroft v. FerralL 51 However,
upon the Solicitor General's admission that the Board for Correction
was an illusory remedy, the Supreme Court remanded. 5
In Crane v. Hedrick,'57 the government argued that an in-service C.O.
should be required to undergo criminal trial by court-martial to exhaust
"administrative remedies." The court observed that neither Congress
nor "the majority of federal courts" had deemed it necessary for an in-
266 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J.
1967). An appeal by Brown resulted in three separate opinions from the Third
Circuit, 387 F.2d 150, one affirming non-reviewability and the other two judges
holding that there was jurisdiction to consider Brown's petition. By the time
Chavez's case reached the Ninth Circuit, he had been discharged and his cause
was moot. 395 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1968). Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit found in-
service C.O. cases to be non-reviewable in Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967).
398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
'5'Id at 715. See Crotty v. Kelly, 443 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1971), in which the
court found it unnecessary to consider the "basis in fact" test, limiting its review
to the military's compliance with regulations.
Id. at 715.
" Id. at 716.
'5 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1960).
408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969).
' 397 U.S. 335 (1970). A description of the workings of the Board for Correc-
tion of Records is contained in Rew v. Ward, 402 F. Supp. 331 (D.N.M. 1975).
117 284 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Cal. 1968). The government's position was based on
inferences from Noyd v. McNamara, 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 378 F.2d
538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967), and Brown v. McNamara, 387
F.2d 150, 153 n.5 (3d Cir. 1967).
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service C.O. to commit a crime in order to test the legality of his deten-
tion in military service as a conscientious objector. 1 During 1972, the
Supreme Court conclusively ruled out the necessity of court-martial as
"exhaustion" in Parisi v. Davidson.'59
The Armed Forces were still free, however, to use plain and simple
administrative delays to impede processing of in-service C.O.'s. For ex-
ample, during 1972, David Beaucage accepted induction in reliance upon
the Army's assurances to the Supreme Court in Ehlert v. United
States' that his in-service conscientious objector claim would be given
full and fair consideration.""' Army processing of Beaucage's application
consumed nine months and nine days, almost forty percent of the total
time he was obligated to serve.162
Procedures for processing in-service C.O. claims have always been
elaborate."3 The conscientious objector first submits a detailed written
application, including general information and essay-type answers to six
questions.' Then personal interviews of the C.O. applicant are con-
ducted by a psychiatrist, a chaplain and an investigating officer. " All in-
terviewers are commissioned military officers. If the in-service C.O. ap-
plicant desires, he may be represented by counsel at the applicant's own
expense at the hearing before the investigating officer. 6
Following the interviews, the investigating officer makes a written
report including findings and recommendations with reasons
therefore."7 The complete record of the case is furnished to the appli-
cant for possible rebuttal to any item in the file. 66 The record is further
reviewed by a military attorney who looks for "completeness and legal
sufficiency."'' 9 After this requirement is satisfied, a higher commander
'5 Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp. 250, 253 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
159 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
160 402 U.S. 99 (1971). See Musser v. United States, 414 U.S. 31 (1973),
reiterating the faith of the Supreme Court in Army C.O. processing.
'6' 5 S.S.L.R. 79 (1972).
162 Id.
1' Evolution of in-service procedures can be divined from Comment, God, the
Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CAL. L.
REV. 379, 405-08 (1968); Brahms, supra note 16, at 18-28 (1970); Gales, Conscience
Vis-a-Vis Contract; The Dilemma Confronting Citizen and System, Airmen & Air
Force: An Analysis of the Most Recent AFR 35-24, Disposition of Conscientious
Objectors, 14 JAG J. 239, 247-56 (1973). Currently the procedures are prescribed
by 32 C.F.R. § 75.6 (1971). Selective Service processes C.O.'s under 47 Fed. Reg.
4640 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636).
'- 32 C.F.R. § 75.9 (1981).
Id § 75.6(c), (d).
Id § 75.6(d)(2)(i).
1.7 Id § 75.6(d)(3).
16 Id
9 Id. § 75.6(e).
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makes a personal recommendation and forwards the record "to the
headquarters of the military service concerned."7 0 The military depart-
ment makes a decision to grant or deny C.O. status. 7 ' However, if the
decision-making headquarters considers any adverse information addi-
tional to the administrative file and the service member's service
record, the applicant is again given opportunity to comment or rebut
such information.' If the final decision is adverse to the applicant,
reasons must be provided.'
In contrast to this intricate and time-consuming regulatory scheme is
the Selective Service conscientious objector processing.' 4 After apply-
ing for C.O. status, the requested classification may be granted upon the
documents in the registrant's file and evidence presented during a per-
sonal appearance before a local board.'75 In the author's experience, from
the last era of the draft a local board would often perfunctorily classify
young men who were Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists or
members of other pacifist denominations as conscientious objectors.
The time required for administrative processing and final decision-
making for in-service C.O.'s may take several months.'76 In the author's
experience, the Air Force is the most dilatory service in handling con-
scientious objectors. During 1977, the Air Force admitted that C.O. pro-
cessing had reached an average time of five months.'77 Further inquiry
was made regarding why the Air Force required this length of time to
process conscientious objectors while only about six weeks were needed
to process discharges for alleged homosexuals. The response was, inter
alia, that the Air Force needed five months to process C.O.'s "to insure
that the rights of the individual and the interests of the Air Force are
protected to the maximum extent."'7 8 The Air Force went on to explain
that its policies and procedures "are designed to provide for the full and
equitable protection of its members' rights and to necessarily protect its
own best interests."'
179
'' Id.
..Id. § 75.6(f).
172 Id
173 Id
' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,640 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636).
,,' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,460 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.8).
176 Of all services, only the Army, by regulation, establishes any time limit for
processing C.O. claims. AR 600-43 (1977), 2-1b, states "it is expected" active
duty C.O. claims "should require under normal conditions, less than 3 months."
Id.
'" Letter from Colonel R.W. Haguer, USAF, Headquarters, United States Air
Force, to the author (Aug. 30, 1977) (on file with author).
17' Letter from Colonel Ronald J. Skorepa, USAF, Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force to Congressman Anthony Beilenson (Feb. 2, 1978) (on file with
author).
'" Id Apparently, however, the Air Force managed to protect itself and its
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If the final decision by the armed forces is to deny C.O. status to an
applicant, the member has the right to petition a federal district court
for a writ of habeas corpus. Time consumed by the courts for consider-
ing such a petition over the post-Vietnam years has greatly increased.
For example, during 1971, in Taylor v. Chaffee,"8 ° a hearing was set on a
petition for habeas corpus by a denied conscientious objector within
about three weeks after filing. The court issued the writ from the bench
and later issued its written decision.18 By 1977, in Ramos v. Stetson,182
the same California District Court that decided Taylor consumed seven
months to render a decision on an in-service C.O. habeas corpus petition.
In Kuisle v. Stetson,"'3 an in-service C.O. petition filed with the court
on July 25, 1978 was decided on June 9, 1980; in Taylor v. Claytor,"'
decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1979, the petitioner had completed his
two years of obligated service by the time the appeal of his denied C.O.
claim was heard. Taylor had applied for conscientious objector status
before he entered active duty.
It should be noted that if certain Department of Defense planners had
had their way in 1972, the regulation allowing for separation of in-
service conscientious objectors would have been abolished.' One reason
stated for this idea was the "federal courts' preoccupation with in-
dividual rights and administrative due process."'8 6 Another reason for
proposing an end to C.O. discharges was that the Vietnam war was near-
ing its end, thus diminishing a need for "a conscientious objector
privilege.1187 This reasoning is faulty since the armed forces' raison
d'etre is to be prepared for combat at any time. A peacetime Army con-
taining an unknown number of C.O.'s who would presumably be eligible
for discharge upon the outbreak of war would be grossly unprepared.
The Department of Defense planners who advocated the elimination of
conscientious objector discharges lost their bid, and the man who
C.O.'s by processing applications in an average of seventy-six days in 1970,
according to Letter from Colonel James J. Shepard, USAF, Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force to Congressman Ronald F. Dellums (Nov. 1, 1973) (on
file with author).
ISO 327 F. Supp. 1131 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
181 Id.
182 No. 77-2467 DWW(P) (C.D. Cal., Feb. 7, 1978). The Air Force had consumed
six months in processing petitioner's C.O. claim, but had still not decided it at the
time the court action was filed.
188 No. 78-M-742 (D. Col., June 9, 1980).
184 601 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1979).
18 Draft, Dept. of Defense Directive 1300.6, undated, to have been effective
Jan. 1, 1973 (on file with author).
188
187 Idj
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becomes a C.O. subsequent to entry into the armed forces remains eligi-
ble to obtain either noncombatant status (1-A-O),' 9 or separation (1-0).' 89
V. CURRENT APPRAISAL
A. Selective Service
On February 1, 1982, the Selective Service System published major
revisions to its regulations.'90 Under the new regulations, conscientious
objector applications usually may be submitted by registrants only after
an order to report for induction has been issued."' Selective Service will
return any C.O. applications to men who submit them prior to receipt of
an induction order.'
92
The requirements for conscientious objector status remain unchanged
since they were established by statute and case law during the Vietnam
era. These requirements are incorporated into the Selective Service
regulations. Registrants must be sincerely opposed to participation in
any form. The claim may be founded either on "strictly religious beliefs"
or upon personal ideals, purely ethical or moral, occupying "a place
parallel to that filled by belief in a Supreme Being for those holding
more traditionally religious views" in the registrant's life.'," C.O.
classification will be denied to those who are found to be insincere;
whose objection "rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism,
expediency, or their own self-interest or well-being"; or who are selec-
tive objectors.'9 4
All C.O. applicants are required to be scheduled for a personal ap-
pearance before local draft boards.' 5 The exceptions to this requirement
are registrants who have been separated from the armed forces as
C.O.'s.' ge If a registrant fails to meet with the board, he will be
rescheduled for a second personal appearance.' 7 Failure to keep this ap-
32 C.F.R. § 75.3(a)(2) (1971).
I& § 75.3(a)(1).
"47 Fed. Reg. 4,640 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1602, 1605, 1609,
1618, 1621, 1624, 1627, 1630, 1633, 1636, 1639, 1642, 1648, 1645, 1651, 1653).
1947 Fed. Reg. 4,640 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.2).
193d.
C c47 Fed. Reg. 4,656 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.3) (I-A-0Classification); 47 Fed. Reg. 4,656 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.4) (1-0
Classification).
' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,656 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.5).
,,' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,651 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1648.3(a)). Procedures
for personal appearances are established by 47 Fed. Reg. 4,661 (1982) (to be
codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1648.5).
'" 47 Fed. Reg. 4,661 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1648.3(a)); 47 Fed.
Reg. 4,652 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1637).
' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,661 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1648.4(b)).
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pointment, without good cause, forfeits the claim to C.O. classification.'0
A registrant denied conscientious objector classification by a local
board must be furnished with reasons for the denial.'99 The reasons must
be supported by evidence in the registrant's file. °0 If the denial is
predicated upon inconsistency or insincerity, the statement of reasons
"should" offer a full explanation."' In other words, a "basis in fact" for
denial must be articulated.
The registrant who is denied C.O. status by a local board has the right
to appeal.0 ' The appellate rights include a personal appearance before
the appeals board.2 3 If the appeal is denied, the registrant is entitled to
the reasons therefor."4 A denial of the appeal that is less than
unanimous gives rise to a right of presidential appeal.0 5
The new Selective Service regulations afford registrants the right to
an advisor at personal appearances before both local boards and appeal
boards.0 6 However, the role of the registrant's advisor is limited to con-
ferring with the registrant before he responds to a board member's in-
quiry or statement.07 The superseded regulations precluded representa-
tion of a registrant at any board hearing by "anyone acting as attorney
or legal counsel."2 This provision has been upheld against constitu-
tional challenges.' As a practical matter, if registrants were permitted
legal representation at Selective Service board hearings, the govern-
ment could claim the same right, transforming personal appearances in-
to full-blown adversary proceedings (at least for registrants able to af-
ford skilled attorneys).
At the time of writing, the only legal action pending under the MSS
Act" ' is the threatened prosecution of young men for failure to register
under the 1980 Presidential Proclamation and implementing
regulation." Upon any resumption of conscription, there would
" 47 Fed. Reg. 4,661 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1648.4(c)).
' 47 Fed. Reg. 4,657 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.10(a)).
2 Id.
20 47 Fed. Reg. 4,657 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1636.10).
47 Fed. Reg. 4,662 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1651.1(b)).
47 Fed. Reg. 4,662 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1651.3(c)).
47 Fed. Reg. 4,663 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1651.4(p)).
47 Fed. Reg. 4,663 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1653.1(b)).
47 Fed. Reg. 4,661 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1648.5(f)); 47 Fed.
Reg. 4,663 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1651.4(g)). The term "advisor" ap-
pears to include attorneys or legal laypeople. Id.
47 Fed. Reg. 4,663 (1982) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1651.4(g)).
32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.4(d), 1626.4(d), 1627.4(d) (1972).
United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879(1965); Steele v. United States, 240 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1956).
10 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451, 453-56, 458-71(a) (1981).
2 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247, 48,130 (1981). Defenses available in these cases are
[Vol. 31:77
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss1/7
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
necessarily arise challenges to the Selective Service System by both
civil actions 21 and by the interposing of defenses to criminal offenses
established under the MSS Act.1 "
The current state of the law regarding pre-induction judicial review
remains that as detailed in 1972 by the Second Circuit in Naskiewicz v.
Lawyer.2" Although the MSS Act prohibits pre-induction judicial review
of Selective Service classification or processing of its registrants except
as a defense to criminal prosecution,2 1 5 there are limited exceptions. The
first exemption exists when a registrant can show a clear statutory
right to an exemption or deferment which involves no discretion by the
local board. 16 This avenue for pre-induction judicial review, however, is
closed to conscientious objectors.2 17
The second exception to the statutory prohibition of pre-induction
judicial review which may apply to conscientious objectors lies in a
situation wherein the Selective Service System violates its own regula-
tions.23 Although Naskiewicz v. Lawyer did not involve a conscientiols
objector, the court cited from in-service C.O. decisions.1
Furthermore, the years since the end of conscription have witnessed
an increasing recognition by federal courts of the duty of all govern-
described in M. VEILUVA, REGISTRATION AND THE MSS ACT: CRIMINAL PENALTIES
FOR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE TO REGISTRATION (1980) and W.
SMITH, LEGAL DEFENSES IN NON-REGISTRATION CASES UNDER THE MSS ACT (May
23, 1981) (Selective Service Law Panel of Los Angeles).
21" For a brief description of possible affirmative civil litigation on behalf of
registrants, see Goldberger, Non-Criminal Legal Challenges to the Draft, ON
WATCH 1 (February 1981).
"' 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1980), prescribes imprisonment for not more than five
years, a fine of $10,000, or both for any violation of the MSS Act and its im-
plementing regulations. Such duties have been held to include: failure to register,
Kaohelaulii v. United States, 389 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1968); failure to report for a
physical examination, United States v. Irons, 369 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1966); failure
to inform Selective Service of change of address, United States v. Haynes, 515
F.2d 275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); making false statements in
connection with draft status, United States v. Lucke, 431 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1970);
and failure to possess Selective Service documents, United States v. Couming,
445 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1971).
214 456 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1972).
21' 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b) (1980).
218 Breen v. Selective Service Board, 396 U.S. 460 (1970); Carey v. Local Board
No. 2, 412 F.2d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1969); Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 383
U.S. 233 (1968).
217 Fein v. Local Board No. 7, 405 U.S. 365 (1972); Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256
(1968).
"" Naskiewicz v. Lawver, 456 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1972); Liese v. Local Board
No. 102, 440 F.2d 645, 646 (8th Cir. 1971); Hunt v. Local Board No. 197, 438 F.2d
1128, 1135 (3d Cir. 1971). None of these cases, however, involved a conscientious
objector.
219 456 F.2d 1166, 1168 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ment agencies to follow their own regulations.220 There is no logical
reason why a Selective Service registrant should be barred from pre-
induction judicial review of denial of conscientious objector status ex-
cept by refusing induction and standing trial as a criminal, whereas the
in-service C.O. is not required to exhaust his remedies through a
criminal trial, i.e., a court-martial. 21'
The standard of judicial review for conscientious objector cases re-
mains the "basis in fact" test, the "narrowest range of review known to
the law."2 2 Reasons for denial of C.O. status must be furnished to the
registrant22 3 and the government is bound to these reasons. " The court
will not rummage through a record to uphold what the government has
done." Procedures prescribed by applicable regulations must be followed
exactly or the government cannot lawfully deny a C.O. application.226
If and when prosecution of conscientious objectors resumes under
the MSS Act, the historic prejudice against them may be expected to
continue. One comment received on the Selective Service proposed
regulations in 1981 stated that C.O.'s should be required to
demonstrate that they would rather go to jail than serve in the
military. 2 During 1980, Congressman Robert Kastenmeir obtained and
released a Selective Service report indicating near-paranoia about con-
scientious objection in any future draft.2" The report assumed that so
many registrants would apply for C.O. status during any future con-
scription that the System would be unable to cope with them.' The
document recommended abolishing the privilege to apply for C.O.
status or at least eliminating the requirement for draft boards to give
reasons for their decisions.'2 Another recommendation was that
' See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974). Regarding the military: Matlovich v. Secretary of
the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857-59 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hall v. Fry, 509 F.2d 1105,
1109 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing in-service C.O. cases).
' Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
United States v. Turcotte, 487 F.2d 417, 419-21 (5th Cir. 1973); Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114, 119-23 (1946) (citing many in-service C.O. cases).
22 Supra notes 199, 204; 50 U.S.C. app. § 471(b)(4). The "basis in fact" require-
ment is separate from the government's obligation to furnish reasons for denial
of C.O. status. The former is a judge-made standard for deciding C.O. cases, the
latter stems from the constitutional right to due process of law. For a
penetrating analysis of this see Drake v. Stetson, 5 MIL. L. REP. (PuB. L. EDUC.
INST.) 2321 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
United States ex rel Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1972).
United States v. Bautista, 497 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811-12 (4th Cir. 1969).
Proposed Selective Service Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,438 (1981) (to be
codified at 32 C.F.R. § 16) (proposed November 17, 1981).
8 Seely, Selective Service Panics Again, 32 CCCO NEWS NOTES 4 (1980).
mI&
' Id at 5.
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[c]onscientious objectors could well be subjected to special tax
assessments in lieu of military or alternate service. This might
include, for example, a property tax taking all property owned
in any amount exceeding $500 (excluding work tools, etc.), coupled
with an income tax amounting to a virtual forfeiture of all in-
come of more than $5,000 per year for a period of anywhere
from five to 20 years. 31
Although the government may be more hostile toward conscientious
objection than during the last conscription, religious groups appear to
be more sympathetic than during the Vietnam era. In 1980, the Men-
nonites began gathering funds to assist draft resisters, and Methodists
provided youths with cards to register as C.O.'s with their churches.2
The Lutheran Council published a letter to Lutheran pastors abjuring
them to support "with counselling and love" those men who refused to
register on grounds of conscience.233
Some form of conscription, or at least a classification of registrants,
may commence as early as during 1983. If so, conscientious objectors
can expect to find their paths made difficult by the historic hostile at-
titude toward them by the government and the general population.
However, there probably will be more support for C.O.'s by religious
and other groups than existed during the Vietnam era.
B. In-Service Conscientious Objection
Currently, the in-service C.O. has the burden to set forth a prima
facie claim consisting of a non-frivolous allegation of opposition to all
war. This allegation must be based on religious training and belief or a
personal moral and ethical code which is sincere.23' Once this prima facie
claim has been submitted, the burden shifts to the government to show
a "basis in fact," consisting of hard, provable, reliable facts justifying
denial of the requested status.3 ' Such facts must constitute more than a
mere scintilla of evidence and must substantially blur the "picture
painted" by the applicant.23
Before final decision is made upon the in-service conscientious objec-
tor's claim, the applicant must be given an opportunity to read, com-
ment upon and rebut adverse information in the file.237 All officials acting
231 I&
" Mackey, Churches Go On Offensive Over Draft Registration, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY 74 (Sept. 15, 1980).
233 Id.
21 Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
' Shaffer v. Schlesinger, 531 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1976); Chilgren v. Schlesinger,
499 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973); Ward v.
Volpe, 484 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1973); Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
United States ex rel Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
7 Crotty v. Kelly, 443 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1971). Selective Service C.O.'s have
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upon a conscientious objector application must reach their conclusions
by a rational process, not by speculation or hunch."
The mere fact that a C.O. application is submitted subsequent to
other requests for discharge or deferment does not per se provide a
basis for concluding that the applicant is insincere." 9 The armed forces
may not rely on actions of the applicant prior to crystallization of cons-
cience as a basis for a finding of insincerity.4 0 However, if the armed
forces can show that an applicant was a C.O. prior to entry, either by in-
duction or enlistment, in the Armed Forces, the application may be
lawfully denied.24 ' This is the "waiver provision," discussed extensively
by the Second Circuit in Foster v. Schlesinger.24
Perhaps the most frequently used basis for a finding of insincerity by
the armed forces, when the applicant applies for C.O. discharge prior to
entering active duty from inactive Reserve status, is "lateness in
filing."2 43 The government contends that because an applicant waited to
apply for C.O. status until a call to active duty was imminent, the appli-
cant was insincere. "Lateness in filing," standing alone, however, is not
a sufficient "basis in fact."2 4  On the other hand, if the in-service appli-
cant in any way indicates a crystallization of conscience subsequent to
induction or enlistment but some months before submitting a C.O. ap-
plication, the armed forces often maintain that the applicant is insincere
because he waited too long to apply.24' This is an example of the
Hobson's choice reasoning to which the armed forces are partial when
dealing with in-service conscientious objectors. 4 '
When the officers who actually interview a C.O. applicant find him to
be sincere and recommend approval, there is a heavy burden on the
armed forces to justify denial of the claim. 47 However, as the United
had this right since 1955. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) (decided
on concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play).
2 Peckat v. Lutz, 451 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1971); Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d
475 (1st Cir. 1969).
2 See, e.g., Capobianco v. Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970).
240 United States ex reL Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, 707 (4th Cir. 1969).
4 32 C.F.R. § 75.4(1) (1981).
22 520 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
143 Most inactive Reserve applicants for C.O. discharge in the 1970's were
"Berry Plan" physicians, commissioned under 32 C.F.R. § 58. An inordinate
number of circuit courts of appeals C.O. decisions during the 1970's involved C.O.
claims made by these physicians.
" See, e.g., La Franchi v. Seamans, 536 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Christensen
v. Franklin, 456 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1972).
2'1 See, e.g., Benbow v. Alexander, No. C-78-2567 SAW (N.D. Cal., Mar. 12,
1979).
"I Goldstein v. Middendorf, 535 F.2d 1339 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex reL
Greenwood v. Resor, 439 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1971).
247 La Franchi v. Seamans, 536 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Lobis v. Secretary of
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States moved towards conservatism in the late 1970's and 1980, three
courts of appeals held against such conscientious objectors, all physi-
cians.""
In two of these cases, Young v. Middendorf.. and Naill v.
Alexander,25 the courts held, in effect, that the appointed military in-
vestigating officers did not know the law and regulations regarding con-
scientious objection when they recommended approval of the applica-
tions after conducting a hearing and investigation. This is contrary to
the well-established "presumption of regularity" attached to actions by
government officials; i.e., an officer is presumed to perform appointed
duties in accordance with law and regulations."'1
In Taylor v. Claytor,52 the Ninth Circuit cited Dickinson v. United
States"3 to allow a judicial search of the record to support the govern-
ment's denial of C.O. status to the petitioner. Ignored was the Ninth Cir-
cuit's own decision in United States v. Bautista254 and the distinguishing
of Dickinson by United States v. Haughton55 as largely inapposite to
conscientious objector cases.
In Naill v. Alexander,58 the Tenth Circuit, despite its own decision in
Fleming v. United States,257 found a heavy burden on conscientious ob-
jectors to prove the existence of religious beliefs.25 Perhaps even more
troublesome for present and future C.O.'s was the accordance by the
Tenth Circuit of a higher status to military regulations than to ap-
plicable case law.25
the Air Force, 519 F.2d 304 (1st Cir. 1975); Chilgren v. Schlesinger, 499 F.2d 204
(8th Cir. 1974); Tressan v. Laird, 454 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1972); Tellez v. Chaffee,
467 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1972); Cubbison v. Laird, 464 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1972);
Strait v. Laird, 464 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1972); Miller v. Chafee, 462 F.2d 335 (9th
Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Laird, 457 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1972); Clement v. Laird, 447
F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1971); Rastin v. Laird, 445 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1971); Tobias v.
Laird, 413 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1969); Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, 705, 708 (4th
Cir. 1969); Singer v. Secretary of the Air Force, 385 F. Supp. 1369 (D.C. Colo.
1974); Nachand v. Seaman, 328 F. Supp. 753 (D.C. Md. 1971); Taylor v. Chaffee,
327 F. Supp. 1131 (D.C. Cal. 1971); Talford v. Seaman, 306 F. Supp. 941 (D.C. Md.
1969); Reitemeyer v. McCrea, 302 F. Supp. 1210 (D.C. Md. 1969).
245 Naill v. Alexander, 631 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Claytor, 601 F.2d
1102 (9th Cir. 1979); Young v. Middendorf, No. 77-1375 (7th Cir., Oct. 20, 1977).
249 No. 77-1375 (7th Cir., Oct. 20, 1977).
o 631 F.2d 696.
21 See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 814 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
m 601 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1979).
- 346 U.S. 389, 396 (1953).
497 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1974).
413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969). Dickinson involved entitlement to a ministerial
exemption, not conscientious objection.
631 F.2d 696.
• 344 F.2d 912, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1965).
2' 631 F.2d at 698.
" Id at 698-99.
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The applicable Department of Defense regulation prescribes that C.O.
applicants must "establish by clear and convincing evidence" their
claims to conscientious objector status."' This flies in the face of deci-
sions by five United States courts of appeals,"' all of which held that the
applicant's only burden is to set forth a prima facie claim, whereupon
the burden shifts to the government to provide a legally sufficient basis
in fact for denial.
The regulatory "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof has
been used recently by the Army, 2 ' Navy" 3 and Air Force6 4 in attempts
to deny conscientious objector claims. These challenges to the burden of
proof established by case law6 have been approved by the Department
of Justice.'
Over the past five years, Young, Naill and Taylor"7 evince a trend by
courts of appeals to hold against conscientious objectors. However,
some decisions by district courts show an opposite disposition; Rogers v.
Alexander6 . and Nickles v. Alexander.9 are on point.
First Lieutenant Rogers and Major Nickles were both graduates of
the United States Military Academy (West Point). Both officers had
subsequently attended and graduated from medical school under Army
auspices. Nickles had even completed residency training in internal
medicine at an Army hospital prior to requesting discharge as a con-
scientious objector.
The Army, quite understandably, found the C.O. claims submitted by
Rogers and Nickles unappealing, to say the least, since they had received
much education at government expense. Despite recommendations for
conscientious objector discharge by the officers appointed to investigate
Rogers' and Nickles' applications, the Army denied their requests.'
20 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(d) (1981).
26 See note 235 supra and accompanying text.
Nickles v. Alexander, 9 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2129 (W.D. Tex.
1981).
'Selinger v. Claytor, No 78-722-F (D. Mass. filed Jan. 21, 1978) (Petition for
Habeas Corpus still sub judice, with preliminary injunction granted Jan. 30, 1978,
restraining petitioner's order to active duty).
' McCorkell v. Orr, 10 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2300 (W.D. Wash.
1982) (Habeas Corpus granted on other grounds).
See note 235 supra and accompanying text.
266 Letter from John H. Davitt, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division to
the author, Nov. 14, 1978. Mr. Davitt's section is charged with Department of
Justice supervision of in-service C.O. litigation.
26 See note 248 supra and accompanying text.
26 9 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2127 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
259 9 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2129. Although the author represented
both Rogers and Nickles and both officers were stationed at the same El Paso,
Texas, Army Installation, they had no connection with each other.
270 Id.
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The district court, however, granted habeas corpus to Rogers and
Nickles, conditioning discharge from the Army upon their reimburse-
ment to the government of the educational funds expended on them.
2
1'
A similar case, McCorkell v. Orr,2 ' was decided in late 1981. Again
the administratively unsuccessful C.O. was a physician who had received
educational benefits from the government in exchange for a commit-
ment to serve in the Armed Forces. Habeas corpus was granted to Dr.
McCorkell, who was ordered to reimburse the government for its expen-
ditures on his education.
The decisions ordering C.O. discharges for Drs. Rogers, Nickles and
McCorkell evidence a current tendency by district courts to regard
military agreements to serve in exchange for educational benefits as
personal service contracts. Substantial justice to the parties is done by
requiring restitution of the value of the schooling if the military
members cannot complete obligated service for reasons of conscience." '
VI. CONCLUSION
If conscription resumes in the future, this author believes im-
provements can be made in the handling of conscientious objectors.
Such improvements could benefit both the objectors and the United
States. Instead of requiring C.O.'s to submit written applications, ap-
pearing before local and appeal boards with witnesses and advisors,
why not merely require them to submit a simple affidavit to National
Headquarters, Selective Service System?
The registrant applying for 1-0 status could be required to attest that
he is sincerely opposed to participation in war in any form, based upon
religious or personal beliefs. Registrants would have to express a will-
ingness to perform alternative civilian service for a period of time
equivalent to that their non-C.O. peers were being required to serve in
the armed forces. A similar form could be used for registrants desiring
1-A-O, noncombatant classification. These men would be required to ex-
press a willingness to serve in the armed forces as noncombatants.
"' Prior to court hearing, Rogers and Nickles made written settlement offers
of $20,000 and $25,000, respectively. These were rejected by the Army and
Department of Justice. Since the court only ordered Rogers to pay $12,864 and
Nickles to pay $2,036.50, the adamance of the government cost the U.S. Treasury
a total of over $30,000. This did not include the cost to the taxpayers of litigation.
The Army flew one of its lawyers from Washington, D.C., to El Paso, Texas, to
argue the Rogers and Nickles cases.
272 10 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2300 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
, The older view was that a judgment conditioning a C.O. discharge was of
questionable validity. Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973); McCullough v.
Seamans, 348 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
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Such a procedure may appear to make it "too easy" to obtain C.O.
classification. However, statistics cited in this article274 prove that
Americans have never applied for conscientious objector status in
numbers nearly large enough to affect military mobilization. This was
true even during the United States longest and most unpopular war,
Vietnam. Peer and parental opinion, the desire to prove "manhood" and
patriotism have all precluded any truly massive resistance to military
service by Americans throughout our national history. And the only
time in American history that all available males of military age were
even needed by the armed forces was at the height of World War II.
The government would benefit from greatly simplified C.O. pro-
cedures. Besides eliminating a costly administrative burden on the
Selective Service System and the armed forces, judicial and United
States attorneys' time would be conserved. The Army would not be
receiving men to utilize as combat troops who, denied C.O. status, only
accepted induction as an alternative to prison. Such men obviously do
not make effective soldiers.
Service in the armed forces of the United States is a privilege, at
least in the sense that medical, moral and mental standards are so high
that a large segment of the population cannot qualify. It is time for
members of Selective Service local and appeals boards to realize these
rather obvious facts. It is also time to assure that no longer will people
sit on draft boards who believe part of their mission is to "sentence"
men to serve in the Army for the unwritten "crime" of vehemently
objecting to so doing.
If the government persists, as is likely, in requiring C.O. applicants to
appear before draft boards, a detailed directive should be published
governing the range of questions relevant to conscientious objection.
When local boards last interviewed C.O.'s, many of their queries
were-quite bluntly-silly. For example, there was the "rape your
grandmother" question, well-known to draft lawyers and counsellors.
Board members would ask whether the registrant would come to the aid
of a female relative if she were being attacked. The question proceeded
from the ridiculous but widespread idea that "opposition to all war" re-
quired a man to stand idly by while his mother was being violently ac-
costed. Such questions may be viewed as an attempt to humiliate a man
because of his religious or ethical beliefs.
For in-service conscientious objectors, there is currently a need-for
amendments to the governing Department of Defense regulation 75 to
preclude the worsening dilatoriness by the military departments in pro-
cessing applicationsY6 The Department of Defense could merely require
27 See notes 30, 39 and 94 supra and accompanying text.
r15 32 C.F.R. § 75 (1981).
276 In its Return to Order to Show Cause in Salcedo v. Orr, No. CV
82-0349-TJH (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 26, 1982), the government admitted that after
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that C.O. claims be processed to final decision within ninety days from
date of application. In Withum v. O'Connor,77 the court would not
countenance a Navy claim that more than eight months was needed to
act on an application for administrative discharge based on recruiter
fraud. It is suggested that the same rationale should be applied to
habeas corpus petitions by in-service C.O.'s. Such petitions should be
granted if a prima facie case has been established and inexcusable pro-
cedural slowness by the armed forces has been shown.
In a 1973 article, Air Force Captain Robert Robinson Gales, pointed
out the fallacy of the regulatory demand that a C.O.'s beliefs be the
"primary controlling force" in the applicant's life." This requirement,
wrote Captain Gales, "is unique to the Department of Defense" and is
additional to any requirements of case law or statute. 9 During 1977, in
Drake v. Stetson,8 8 the Air Force unsuccessfully argued that the
regulatory "primary controlling force" language was a necessary part of
the prima facie claim to conscientious objector status. Yet, in 1982, in-
service C.O.'s were still under a burden, manufactured by the military,
to show their beliefs to be "the primary controlling force" in their
lives.2"' This requirement should be eliminated. It has no basis in law.
Since the regulatory burden of proof upon in-service conscientious ob-
jectors to establish their claims by "clear and convincing evidence"" 2 is
contrary to the weight of well-established case law,283 it should also be
eliminated. In fact, if the military were privileged to deny C.O. applica-
tions on the grounds that "clear and convincing" evidence had not been
submitted, the regulatory right to in-service conscientious objection
would be rendered nugatory.
Finally, the requirement that in-service C.O.'s be interviewed by a
psychiatrist"' should be eliminated. The mandatory psychiatric evalua-
tion has little purpose except to humiliate conscientious objectors by its
implicit assumption that C.O.'s have mental problems. During 1981, the
armed forces processed 449 C.O. claims.8 5 Assuming the psychiatric in-
more than eight months from its submission, a C.O. application still had not left
the initial processing headquarters. This time included more than two months
during which the Air Force lost the applicant's file.
506 F. Supp. 1374 (D.P.R. 1981).
278 Conscience Vis-a-Vis Contract,; the Dilemma Confronting Citizen & System,
Airman & Air Force, 14 JAG J. 239, 246 (1973).
79 Id.
m 5 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2321 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
281 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(c) (1981).
212 Id. § 75.5(d).
' See cases cited in note 235 supra. Contra Naill v. Alexander, 631 F.2d 696
(10th Cir. 1980).
32 C.F.R. § 75.6(c) (1981).
See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
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terview consumed one-half hour for each of these objectors, 224.5 hours
of military psychiatric time was wasted. 88
One may or may not agree with this Article's initial proposition that
military service is a patriotic obligation of all American citizens.
However, it is undeniable that shabby treatment and lack of respect has
generally been the lot of the American conscientious objector.
Conscientious objector status should be granted more liberally in the
future both by the Selective Service and the Armed Forces. The C.0.
certainly should be respected as someone not unpatriotic, but perhaps
loving God and neighbor more or in a different manner than those
whose consciences permit combatant military service.
In only two of the hundreds of in-service cases handled by the author from
1970-1982 did an examining psychiatrist recommend separation on psychiatric
grounds. In both cases, the psychiatrists' recommendations were ignored.
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss1/7
